Détournement De Pouvoir in The Abuse of Authority in Auditing Goods and Services Procurement Projects by The Supreme Audit Institution (BPK)

Abstract

The Supreme Audit Institution (BPK) holds a crucial mandate in goods and services procurement, yet indications of détournement de pouvoir (abuse of authority) by BPK auditors have created a misalignment between audit norms and implementation reality, potentially damaging the public business ecosystem. This study aims to critically analyze the BPK's détournement de pouvoir through a Business Law framework and construct a new argument regarding its impact on governance and contractual certainty. The methodology employs juridical-normative research with conceptual and statute approaches. Secondary data were collected through library research and analyzed qualitatively-deductively, focusing on the principles of Good Corporate Governance (GCG), Fiduciary Duty, and Contractual Certainty. The findings indicate that the BPK's détournement de pouvoir is constructed as a fundamental breach of the public auditor's Fiduciary Duty, which analytically creates a serious disruption to Good Government Governance (GGG) and increases transactional risk. The main implication is the necessity for internal BPK reform through the reaffirmation of fiduciary responsibility and the standardization of business risk-based audits to restore market confidence and economic efficiency in public procurement. The limitation of this study is its juridical-normative nature, where the analysis is not supported by quantitative empirical data of specific BPK cases. The novelty and originality lie in the construction of a new argument that explicitly shifts the analysis of détournement de pouvoir from the Administrative Law domain to the Business Law domain, framing it as a governance failure and a threat to Contractual Certainty, which has not been undertaken by previous research.